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PATENT LITIGATION ATTORNEYS’ FEES:
SHIFTING FROM STATUS TO CONDUCT
Daniel Roth*

ABSTRACT
Abusive patent assertion results in deadweight losses to society. Faced
with the high cost of patent litigation, companies often settle for an amount
equal to a fraction of the cost of defending a patent infringement suit. This
allows the patent owner to extract settlements from many individuals without the
risk of invalidation before a federal court. Shifting attorneys’ fees to the
prevailing party is a remedy courts award in exceptional cases to deter patent
owners from bringing unreasonable claims of infringement and to return
defendants to the position they were in prior to litigation. Current fee-shifting
proposals target patent assertion entities rather than scrutinizing the heart of
the infringement claim—the patent claims and the activities of the accused
infringer. This Note analyzes the history of fee-shifting in patent cases and
examines the proposed SHIELD Act. Next, this Note describes the problems with
the proposed legislation’s definition of disfavored patent plaintiffs, bad actors,
and the loser-pays rule. Finally, this Note concludes by proposing a solution,
which modifies the standard for shifting attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285.

INTRODUCTION
As a small business owner opens her mail, she receives a letter from a
company that she has never heard of before. She is surprised to read that this
company is accusing her of infringing a patent that covers her photocopier and
demands she pay a whopping $1000 per employee. She is not sure what to do
next: call an attorney, pay the licensing fee, or try to bargain with the patent
owner.
This is an all-too-common occurrence in which a patent owner targets
small companies who cannot afford to defend an infringement lawsuit and do
not understand patent law.1 Many patent owners have started to engage in patent
*

Copyright © 2014 Daniel Roth. The author would like to thank Professors Christi
Guerrini, Edward Lee, and David Schwartz, as well as all of the participants in the 2013
Summer IP Writing Colloquium at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1
Mike Masnick, Patent Troll Shell Companies Shake Down Small Businesses for
$1K per Employee for Using Network Scanner, TECHDIRT (Jan. 2, 2013),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130102/08174721543/patent-troll-shell-companiesshake-down-small-businesses-1k-per-employee-using-network-scanner.shtml.
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enforcement through shell companies that send out infringement letters to
hundreds of users of a product, in this case, any scanner connected to the
Internet.2 Targeting users further down the supply chain rather than the scanner
manufacturers directly allows the patent holder to collect a huge number of
settlements and avoid litigation.3 Following this model is very lucrative and low
risk, because, unlike large manufacturers, the targets of these letters do not have
the capital, legal acumen or incentive to invalidate the asserted patents.4
The patent system is justified by weighing the benefit to society of a new
and useful invention against the profits and licensing fees gained by the
invention’s creator.5 Frivolous patent litigation is a problem that results in
deadweight losses, which are eventually passed on to consumers.6 When the
economics of patent litigation allow patent trolls to demand license fees with
virtually no risk, society as a whole is worse off. 7
The patent-trolling practice has recently garnered the attention of
President Obama and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).8 Calls for action
against the owners of the these patents are justified by the massive economic
effects to American small businesses; however, in making policy choices to
deter patent trolling, it is imperative to recognize the importance of making
patent law business-entity-neutral so that we do not devalue patents thereby
diminishing the incentive to invent.9
Traditionally, each party pays its own patent litigation costs. An
exception to this default rule lies in § 285 of the patent statute, which states:
2

See David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing
Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at
106), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2117421.
3
Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How are Patent Cases Resolved? An
Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 Wash.
U. L. Rev. 237, 243–44 (2006).
4
John R. Allison, Mark A Lemley, & John Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement
Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 700–01 (2011).
5
Kesan & Ball, supra note 3, at 239.
6
Marie Gryphon, Assessing the Effects of a “Loser Pays” Rule on the American
Legal System: An Economic Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 567, 568 (2011).
7
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL & OFFICE OF SCI.
& TECH. POLICY, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT,
Jun.
2013,
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
8
Grant Gross, FTC to Launch New Investigation of Patent Trolls, PCWORLD (June
20, 2013), available at http://www.pcworld.com/article/2042557/ftc-to-launch-newinvestigation-of-patent-trolls.html.
9
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Troll Panel at Yale Law School, PATENTLY-O
(May 14, 2013), available at http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/05/patent-trollpanel-at-yale-law-school.html.
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“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.”10 However, defendants who attempt to utilize fee-shifting
under § 285 rarely succeed.11 The low success rate is attributable to the courts’
two-prong requirement that litigation was both (a) brought in bad faith and (b)
objectively baseless.12
In an effort to deter frivolous litigation, proposed changes to § 285 would
automatically require certain bad actors asserting patent infringement or
defending patent validity to pay the adverse party’s attorneys’ fees should the
bad actor fail on the validity or infringement analysis.13 As proposed, the
SHIELD Act of 2013 defines parties subject to fee-shifting as a party alleging
infringement that is not: an original inventor or assignee, engaged in exploitation
of the patent through production or sale, or a university or technology transfer
center.14 The bill states that the “Court shall award the recovery of full costs” to
the prevailing party asserting invalidity or noninfringement.15
This Note recognizes that existing fee-shifting proposals target patent
owners based upon a problematic classification and proposes a fee-shifting
regime to reduce frivolous patent litigation claims that focuses on the plaintiff’s
behavior rather than its status. The proposed framework will address the
shortcomings of the existing litigation framework and proposed solutions by
analyzing the merits of the infringement claim rather than attempting to define
class of “bad actor” patent infringement plaintiffs.
Part I analyzes the costs and economics of patent litigation and presents
the existing mechanisms available to deter frivolous patent litigation. Next, Part
II proposes a solution, which would modify § 285 of the patent statute. Finally,
Part III addresses potential criticisms of the proposed fee-shifting framework.

I. THE PROBLEM OF PATENT EXTORTION AND A FEE-SHIFTING
PROPOSAL TO CURB IT
The economics of patent litigation force the recipient of an infringement
letter to either (1) settle with the patent owner and pay a license fee, or (2)
10

35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006).
Randall R. Rader, Colleen V. Chien & David Hricik, Make Patent Trolls Pay in
Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/makepatent-trolls-pay-in-court.html?_r=0 (finding that fees were shifted only twenty times in
nearly three thousand patent cases in 2011).
12
MarcTec, LLC v. Johnson & Johnson, 664 F.3d 907, 916 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting
iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011)) (“Under this standard,
a patentee’s case ‘must have no objective foundation, and the plaintiff must actually
know this.’”).
13
Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R.
845, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
14
Id.
15
Id.
11
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defend itself in federal district court.16 Whether the patent is valid and infringed
or not may not be of primary concern to the recipient of an infringement letter.
When the company is faced with two options, each of which will require it to
expend substantial sums of money, it will choose the option that will cost the
least.
A. Patent Litigation
A patent does not confer the right to practice the claimed invention.
Instead, it only provides the right to exclude others from practicing the
invention.17 Inventors may exploit the invention by licensing the technology or
by enforcing the patent rights in federal court. An action for patent infringement
gives the owner of the patent the ability to seek damages and/or injunctions
against others that practice the claimed invention.18 However, alleged infringers
may challenge the patent by providing clear and convincing evidence in order to
invalidate it.
The costs associated with patent litigation are high as suits can range from
$0.5 million to $3 million per claim at issue.19 The incentives for parties to settle
is likewise high because as it becomes likely for a patent to be invalidated, the
patent holder is willing to grant a cheap license, and the defendant is likely to
accept an offer rather than incur further legal costs.20 This creates a system
where a patent will not become invalidated unless the alleged infringers’ costs of
continued litigation are less than the proposed license.

16

But see Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2 (manuscript at 107).
The new inter partes review (IPR) and post grant review (PGR) proceedings
authorized by the America Invents Act may present opportunities for low-cost
patent invalidation. The final rules were set in late 2012, and thus we do not
know yet whether this will reduce the wasteful transaction costs in challenging
low-quality patents. Perhaps, as some have contended, the estoppel provision
governing both IPR and PGR may prove to be too heavy a burden for
challengers to bear, but perhaps not.
Id. (manuscript at 126) (citations omitted).
17
See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
18
Id. §§ 283–284.
19
Jim Kerstetter, How Much is that Patent Lawsuit Going to Cost You?, CNET (Apr.
5, 2012), http://news.cnet.com/8301-32973_3-57409792-296/how-much-is-that-patentlawsuit-going-to-cost-you/ (quoting the American Intellectual Property Law Association
Economic Survey of 2011).
20
Kesan & Ball, supra note 3, at 243.

No. 1]

Patent Litigation Attorneys’ Fees: Shifting from Status to Conduct

261

B. Patent Monetization
Patents are a unique asset which requires significant investment to
obtain,21 but do not generate revenue unless licensed or asserted. Patents are also
alienable; the right to exclude others from practicing the claims may be bought
or sold at will. These attributes have led to the rise of patent aggregators, who do
not practice the invention, but instead procure or purchase patents and enforce
them against others who infringe.22 Such aggregators are called non-practicing
entities (NPEs), patent assertion entities (PAEs), patent monetization entities
(PMEs), or, more pejoratively, patent trolls.23 These patent holders are often
characterized as entities that contribute nothing to society, but merely wait for
others to bring a product to market and demand a toll as their primary source of
revenue.
C. The Evolution of the Criticism of “Bad Actors”
As the number of NPEs has grown, so has criticism.24 The conventional
wisdom is that NPEs block innovation by forcing productive companies to pay
for a patent license without adding any value to society themselves.25 A common
criticism is that NPEs have no fear of being counter-sued for infringement, and,
thus, are unwilling to settle on reasonable terms.26 However, “[p]atent
aggregation is not limited to NPEs anymore, if it ever was.”27 While contempt
for NPEs is widespread, many believe that analyses of NPE litigation must be
closely scrutinized to determine which instances are abusive litigation and which
are asserting patents that are valid and infringed.28
21

Legal fees associated with preparation of United States and foreign patent
applications, navigating the patent prosecution process, and maintenance fees for a patent
family can approach $100,000. Steven J. Shumaker, Building a Patent Portfolio that
Supports
Your
Business
Objectives
1
n.1
(2002),
available
at
http://www.ssiplaw.com/files/strategy.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2013).
22
Michael Risch, Patent Portfolios as Securities, 63 DUKE L.J. 89, 96 (2013).
23
Id.
24
Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500:
Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on U.S. Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357,
376 (2012) (finding the impact of patent monetization entities on patent litigation is both
dramatic and growing over time).
25
James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs of NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 21–22), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2091210. The direct costs of NPE
patent litigation are “substantial, totaling about $29 billion accrued cost in 2011.” Id.
(manuscript at 42). A substantial portion of the stated $29 billion is a “deadweight loss to
society.” Id. (manuscript at 16).
26
Risch, supra note 22, at 96.
27
Id.
28
Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2 (manuscript at 110).
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There is certainly no uniformly accepted definition of who is an NPE or
patent troll.29 Some entities clearly fall within most definitions of these “bad
actors,” e.g., a shell company unrelated to the original inventors that purchases a
patent for the sole purpose of enforcement.
1. Bessen & Meurer: Defining the Bad Actor
In their oft-cited paper on the cost of NPEs to society,30 Bessen and
Meurer use an expansive definition of non-practicing entity, which exceeds even
those used by those most critical of NPEs.31 Bessen and Meurer equate NPE and
patent troll and use RPX’s definition of NPE which includes: PAE’s, individual
inventors, universities, and non-competing entities (operating companies
asserting patents well outside the area in which they make products and
compete).32 This definition is extremely broad; many leading scholars do not
consider universities to be patent trolls even though they rarely engage in
commercialization of a product.33 In the patent food chain, university faculty and
graduate students are often true innovators that file patent applications through
tech-transfer centers and are less likely to engage in patent assertion.34 Academic
research does not involve manufacturing, marketing, or distribution and,
therefore, would fall under the extremely broad definition of non-practicing
entity that seems to cover every patent owner that does not bring a product,
covered by the patent, to market.35
Similarly, many do not view individual inventors as bad actors.36
Individual inventors frequently complain that most large companies ignore
requests to license their patents, even when infringing, without the inventor first
having brought suit for patent infringement.37 If university and individual
patentees are to receive compensation for their patented inventions, then their
licensees or proven infringers must sell products or services embodying their
patents. In the absence of such market adoption, there is rarely, if ever, a reward
29

John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111,
2112 n.7 (2007).
30
Bessen & Meurer, supra note 25.
31
Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2 (manuscript at 108).
32
Bessen & Meurer, supra note 25 (manuscript at 10).
33
Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2 (manuscript at 105).
34
Bessen & Meurer, supra note 25 (manuscript at 14) (arguing that an overbroad
definition and biased sampling group were extrapolated to all NPEs causing Bessen &
Meurer’s reported cost of $29 billion in 2011 to be inflated beyond a realistic estimate of
the effect of NPE litigation).
35
Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2 (manuscript at 105).
36
Bessen & Meurer, supra note 25 (manuscript at 8–9).
37
Gene Quinn, Is Patent Litigation Really a Problem for Big Tech?, IPWATCHDOG
(May 2, 2013, 8:30 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/05/01/is-patent-litigationreally-a-problem-for-big-tech/id=39325/.
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to be had.38 Such innovators do not typically have the access to the capital
necessary to bring their inventions to market. They also do not have the existing
channels of manufacturing, marketing and distribution. As a result, their options
in trying to receive any compensation for their patented technologies are quite
limited.39
Bessen and Meurer also include practicing entities (patent owners who
manufacture products) within their definition of non-practicing entities, if the
acquired patents are “well outside the area in which they make products.”40
Delineating between patents that a practicing company practices and those they
hold for other reasons presents a very broad definition.
2. Schwartz & Kesan: Question How to Define an NPE and Whether Litigation
Costs Are a Deadweight Loss to Society
Most definitions ignore the valuable roles that NPE’s may play in the
marketplace. They create options to generate rewards for innovators who prefer
to monetize rather than commercialize their patents themselves.41 Together with
contingency fee lawyers whose business models depend on choosing the right
patents and the right patentees, NPEs can create important avenues for
appropriating rewards for valuable patent rights that are owned by non-market
players.42 Entities that use their patented technologies to make products—
traditional practicing entities—may lack the resources to enforce their patent
rights by hiring traditional patent attorneys who engage in hourly billing
practices. The risk and uncertainty associated with representing patentees that do
not have the ability to pay traditional hourly billing rates is prohibitive, and
hence, many smaller patentees are shut out of the typical enforcement
mechanisms that are available to large companies.43 Taking on the burden of
enforcing patents through a contingency fee representation is an option that is
available primarily for a select group of innovators with patent rights that are
perceived as valuable before litigation commences.44
A patent pool is another type of NPE that operates in a related fashion.
RPX, which calls itself a defensive patent aggregator, has a unique business
model; it provides subscriptions to customers who are repeat defendants in

38

John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 545 (2010)
(“For small firms or independent inventors, . . . patent rights might be the only effective
means to obtain a return on investments in research and development.”).
39
Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2 (manuscript at 109).
40
Id.
41
Id. (manuscript at 110).
42
Id.
43
David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent
Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 347 (2012).
44
Id.
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patent infringement lawsuits.45 RPX asserts that its subscription fees to its
service are lower than the typical patent acquisition and defense costs a client
would otherwise pay.46 In the patent litigation arms race, we have NPEs
aggregating on both sides.
Individuals have long assigned their patents to companies that have
aggregated them. Usually, such patents came from employees who assigned
inventions to their employers. As the numbers of employees and inventions
grow, so does the company’s patent portfolio. It is not surprising that large
companies have long aggregated many more patents than small companies.47
A well-known example is IBM, which has more patents than any other
practicing company.48 IBM’s patenting activity protects the company by saving
litigation costs and raising revenue. IBM is rarely sued for patent infringement
by its competitors because other practicing companies that might sue IBM
would likely face multiple counterclaims of infringement.49 IBM’s portfolio
reduces the threat of litigation by facilitating cross-licenses between IBM and
the other party. Aggregators also use their portfolio as a source of revenue by
licensing their technology. A prime example is a 1993 license of all of IBM’s
personal computer patents to Dell, for $293 million.50
Recently, large companies have begun to acquire large portfolios51 of
patents from non-traditional sources such as individuals, acquired companies,
and other large companies, rather than from their own employees. 52 They have
done so for three reasons. First, each patent purchased by these companies
cannot be purchased by an NPE. Aggregation tends toward an arms race to
avoid patent assertion by others. The value of defensive aggregation is in the
lack of enforcement. Second, companies that lack an arsenal of defensive
patents might buy patents from others or otherwise begin to aggregate patents to

45

Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2 (manuscript at 104).
Id.
47
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2128 (2000).
48
Risch, supra note 22, at 10.
49
Colleen Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 321–22 (2010).
50
Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
51
Amir Efrati & Spencer E. Ante, Google’s $12.5 Billion Gamble, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
16, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240531119033929045765099538214
37960.html (Google purchased Motorola Mobility for $12.5 billion, which included a
portfolio of more than 17,000 patents.).
52
Risch, supra note 22, at 10.
46
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protect themselves from lawsuits by competitors.53 Third, a large patent portfolio
allows a greater freedom to innovate. Some claim that a large portfolio improves
a company’s ability to further innovation in the form of patents and other
development.54 This also means that the company can enhance its licensing
efforts by including acquired patents in a portfolio along with patents developed
in-house.55
While scholars might lament a patent system that encourages more and
more aggregation, there is no question that the practice has expanded, or that it
was ever limited to NPEs.56 With this observation in mind, patent reformers seek
to lessen the burden of frivolous litigation by awarding attorneys’ fees.
D. Existing Fee-Shifting Mechanisms
Fee-shifting is a remedy that allows a prevailing party to be recompensed
for attorneys’ fees incurred during litigation, allowing the party to be more fully
returned to its position prior to involvement in litigation. For defendants, a
victory in court is still a losing situation because, even when they are successful
on non-infringement and/or invalidity claims, they incur significant legal fees
along the way. When attorneys’ fees are shifted onto the losing party, the
prevailing party will receive its entire award, rather than the monetary judgment
less attorneys’ fees. Current mechanisms for a party to receive attorneys’ fees
include Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 35 U.S.C. § 285.
1. Baseline Rule on Fee-Shifting
In the current American patent litigation scheme, each litigant pays its
own attorneys’ fees.57 This incentivizes abusive litigation by plaintiffs because it
forces defendants to either settle quickly or defend the claims at significant
cost.58 For instance, in nuisance suits, a patent owner files a patent infringement
claim seeking to license a patent for royalty payments small enough that
licensees decide it is not worth going to court.

53

Id. at 57. But see Edmund W. Kitsch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the
Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1739 (2000) (An
inventor “will usually hold not one, but multiple rights, which will often be interrelated
. . . . A single patent claim, much less than a single patent, often covers only a small part
of the technology needed to market a commercially competitive device.”).
54
Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
33–34 (2005).
55
Id. at 52 (finding the whole of a patent portfolio is greater than the sum of its parts).
56
Risch, supra note 22, at 11.
57
Gryphon, supra note 6, at 568.
58
Id.
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Modern European codes prescribe “two-way fee-shifting,” colloquially
referred to as the “English Rule.”59 Under the English Rule, the costs of
litigation for each party are imposed on the defeated party, whether the defeated
party is the plaintiff or the defendant60 This disincentivizes purely nuisance suits
by increasing the potential costs to the plaintiff. In other words, plaintiffs would
never file purely nuisance suits because a plaintiff who is only seeking a
settlement would be unwilling to risk failure in litigation.61 When the plaintiff is
unlikely to prevail, the plaintiff’s willingness to file a claim is much lower under
the English Rule.
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court held in 1796 that a
prevailing party could not recover attorneys’ fees as damages, a doctrine now
known as the “American Rule.”62 Under the default “American Rule,” a
prevailing party generally cannot recover attorneys’ fees as damages unless
permitted by legislation.63 Congress has bypassed this default rule in the past by
making explicit provisions for the allowance of attorneys’ fees in order to
effectuate important legislative policies. Examples of such legislation awarding
attorneys’ fees are present in antitrust statutes under the Clayton Act64 and in the
Civil Rights Act.65
Under the American Rule, even if a plaintiff is unwilling to go to trial, it
is still profitable for the plaintiff to file a nuisance claim whenever the plaintiff’s
cost of filing is less than the defendant’s cost of defense, because the defendant
will be willing to pay the plaintiff a settlement of any amount up to the
defendant’s would-be defense costs.66 Relatedly, under the American Rule
(whenever the cost of filing is less than the defense costs plus the plaintiff’s
59

Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 46 (1984), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/
vol47/iss1/3/.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306, 306 (1796).
63
See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 262 (1974)
(“[C]ircumstances under which attorneys’ fees are to be awarded and the range of
discretion of the courts in making those awards are matters for Congress to determine.”).
64
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and
shall recover threefold the damages by his sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney’s fee.”).
65
42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (2006) (“In any action commenced pursuant to this
subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall
be liable for costs the same as a private person.”).
66
David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their
Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L & ECON. 3, 3 (1985), available at
www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/shavell/pdf/5_Inter_Rev_Law_Econ_3.pdf.
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expected judgment) a plaintiff with a low likelihood of prevailing, will file a
claim more often.67
2. Federal Floor for Attorneys’ Fees: Rule 11
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes the federal
floor for recovery of attorneys’ fees in “frivolous” actions.68 To evaluate
frivolousness, courts use an objective standard of reasonableness, and do not
require bad faith or an otherwise culpable state of mind.69
All pleadings, motions, papers, and representations to the court must meet
the requirements of Rule 11 or they risk triggering sanctions against the
offending parties and their attorneys. A patentee planning to take action against
a suspected infringer should be especially attentive to Rule 11(b), which states
that a person, by presenting to the court “a pleading, written motion, or other
paper is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,” (1) the
purpose of the paper or pleading is not improper; (2) the legal assertions are not
frivolous; and (3) the factual contentions have or are likely to have evidentiary
support.70 Under Rule 11(c), a court may impose sanctions against parties or
attorneys that have violated Rule 11(b).71
Generally, the Federal Circuit has analyzed the pre-filing requirements of
Rule 11(b) in patent infringement cases under the constraint of nonfrivolousness72 and as two separate requirements: legal and factual.73 If the court
determines that a party or attorney has violated Rule 11(b), “the court may
award to the party prevailing on the [motion for sanctions] reasonable expenses
and attorney fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion.”74 Currently,
trial courts have discretion to grant expenses or fees to the prevailing party, but
the jurisprudence of Rule 11 motions in patent cases shows that the required prefiling inquiry is a low hurdle for plaintiffs, as some infringement analysis is
required, but not necessarily a claim chart.75

67

Id. at 5, 9.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4) (Sanctions imposed under the rule “must be limited to what
suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly
situated . . . [and may take the form of] an order directing payment to the movant of part
or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees . . . .”).
69
Douglas J. Pepe, Persuading Courts to Impose Sanctions on Your Adversary, 36
No. 2 LITIGATION 21, 25 (2010).
70
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (emphasis added).
71
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
72
Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
73
Antonius v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 275 F.3d 1066, 1071–72 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
74
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
75
Q-Pharma, 360 F.3d at 1301.
68
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Additionally, Rule 11 contains a safe harbor provision that requires that
any motion for sanctions must be served at least twenty-one days before the
motion is filed with the court so that the offending party has the opportunity to
withdraw the challenged filing. Thus, if caught in violation of Rule 11, bringing
a facially invalid or inaccurate patent complaint, the plaintiff will have the
opportunity to abandon the suit or file an amended complaint before the motion
for sanctions can actually be filed.76 It is clear that Rule 11 sanctions do not
adequately protect defendants from nuisance claims.
3. Exceptional Cases under 35 U.S.C. § 285
Fee-shifting is not a new concept in intellectual property law. Congress
has allowed prevailing parties in copyright cases to receive attorney’s fees as
well.77 However, initially, the Patent Act of 1790 did not include any provisions
for the award of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party. 78
In order to obtain an award of attorney fees under § 285, the prevailing
party must show by clear and convincing evidence that the case is exceptional.79
The attorney-fee-shifting provision of the Patent Act provides that, a “court in
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing
party.”80 This remedy is intended to reimburse the alleged infringer for
defending an action improperly brought. Absent Rule 11 misconduct or fraud
during patent prosecution, the defendant must show that the case is
“exceptional” by showing that the litigation was both (a) brought in subjective
bad faith; and (b) objectively baseless.81 An exceptional case finding is
determined on a claim-by-claim basis and both prongs must be satisfied for each
asserted claim. The Federal Circuit has also held that attorneys’ fees should be
awarded in cases involving “vexatious or unjustified litigation” or “frivolous
filings.”82 These types of cases present inconsistent standards that fail to provide

76

Thomas I. Ross, Making Patent Plaintiffs Pay, 18 NO. 6 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J.
1, 2 (2006).
77
17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012) (“In any civil action under this title, the court in its
discretion may allow recovery of full costs . . . the court may also award a reasonable
attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.”).
78
Emily H. Chen, Making Abusers Pay: Deterring Patent Litigation by Shifting
Attorneys’ Fees, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 351, 362 (2013).
79
MarcTec, LLC v. Johnson & Johnson, 664 F.3d 907, 915 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing
Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 339 F.3d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
80
Id.
81
Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing
Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
82
Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1311 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
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clear guidelines to district courts, which must apply the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of § 285.83
Despite defendants’ growing desire to use fee-shifting to recoup costs and
deter future abusive litigation, it is difficult for litigants to meet the “exceptional
case” standard for fee-shifting under the Patent Statute. Further, Congress failed
to codify fee-shifting in the most recent patent reform act, the America Invents
Act of 2011.84 Ultimately, Congress altered rules limiting joinder of
defendants,85 but a fee-shifting provision was omitted for reasons that remain
unclear.86
E. Fee-Shifting Proposal to Curb Trolling Abuse: The SHIELD Act
On February 27, 2013, Representatives Jason Chaffetz and Peter DeFazio
introduced the most recent version of the SHIELD Act.87 The proposed
legislation includes a hybrid fee-shifting provision and a carefully drafted
bonding requirement88 that could provide a strong structure for a compromise
between the English and American Rules. Under the SHIELD Act of 2013, any
adverse party must post a bond (determined by the court) to cover full costs of
the litigation, including attorneys’ fees, unless the court determines the adverse
party (1) is an original inventor; (2) has substantially invested in production or
sale of an item covered by the patent; or (3) is a university or a technology
transfer organization which commercializes technologies developed by a
university.89 This bonding requirement forces plaintiffs to carefully consider the
likelihood that their claim will succeed rather than filing a nuisance suit,
regardless of merit, to put pressure on a potential licensee.

83

Chen, supra note 78, at 15.
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C. § 1454).
85
35 U.S.C.A. § 299 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-49) (requiring claims against
defendants arise out of “the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions . . . of
the same accused product or process”); see Colleen Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers,
PATENTLY -O (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/chien-patenttrolls.html (finding misjoinder rules have had their intended effect).
86
Chen, supra note 78, at 366.
87
See Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013,
H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) (would amend § 285(A). Recovery of litigation
costs).
88
Id. (stating that new sections would be added including § 285A(b) “BOND
REQUIRED.—Any party that fails to meet a condition under subsection (a)(3) shall be
required to post a bond in an amount determined by the court to cover the recovery of full
costs described in subsection (a)(4).”).
89
Id.
84

270

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

[Vol. 13

1. Defining Bad Actors
The SHIELD Act of 2013 approaches the challenge of defining bad actors
in a novel manner. Instead of attempting to define the bad actors it seeks to
target (patent trolls and other non-practicing entities), the Act of 2013 uses a
negative definition;90 it applies to everyone that does not fall into one of the
three carve-outs. The Act describes three categories of patent infringement
plaintiffs which typically are not “patent trolls” or “non- practicing entities,” and
are, therefore, exempt from the attorneys’ fee-shifting provision.91 Under the
SHIELD Act of 2013, a party is exempt from fee shifting when it can show it (1)
is the original inventor; (2) has substantially invested in production or sale of an
item covered by the patent; or (3) is a university or is a technology transfer
organization which commercializes technologies developed by a university. The
categories carved out for “original inventors” and “university or technology
transfer organizations” are clearly defined and should be easily evaluated by the
courts. However, the litigants will likely argue over whether a losing party falls
into the “exploitation of the patent” category.92 The exploitation exception
pertains to cases where the losing party “can provide documentation . . . of
substantial investment . . . in the exploitation of the patent through production or
sale of an item covered by the patent.”93 This new carve-out for entities which
engage in “substantial investment” will be the focus of much interpretation, but
overall, this SHIELD Act of 2013’s definition of bad actors is clearly novel. It
remains to be seen whether it will be an effective approach to mitigate bad
actors in the patent system.
2. Automatic Fee-Shifting
The 2013 version of the SHIELD Act, unlike the 2012 version,94 does not
require a judicial determination that the complainant did not have a “reasonable
likelihood of succeeding” in its claim for patent infringement. Instead, the 2013
90

Chen, supra note 78, at 376.
Id.
92
Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R.
845, 113th Cong. § 285A(d)(2) (1st Sess. 2013).
93
Chen, supra note 78, at 378.
94
See Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2012,
H.R. 6245, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012).
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 285, in an action disputing the
validity or alleging the infringement of a computer hardware or software patent,
upon making a determination that the party alleging the infringement of the
patent did not have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding, the court may award
the recovery of full costs to the prevailing party, including reasonable
attorney’s fees, other than the United States.
Id. (emphasis added).
91
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version of the SHIELD Act simply forces the losing plaintiff to pay by default,
unless the losing plaintiff meets one of the three criteria discussed above or there
are exceptional circumstances making the award unjust.95

II. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Low-merit legal suits, which clutter the legal system and ultimately raise
costs for consumers, can be reduced by patent litigation reform.96 Fee shifting is
one way to effect this change. Plaintiffs will be less likely to file low-merit
claims when forced to bear the risk of their opponent’s legal expenses in
addition to their own.
There has been a growing trend over the last decade for third parties to
acquire patent rights as an investment vehicle and assert those rights to obtain a
return on their investment. Unfortunately, in many cases, the assertion is utterly
baseless, yet respectable companies with a need to make reasonable business
decisions are compelled to pay to settle these cases because it is far less
expensive to pay than it is to fight and win. This is certainly a problem: bad
actors bringing frivolous patent suits against good companies with the goal of
extracting a settlement from those good companies based on the inevitable
rational business judgment that it is far less expensive to settle the frivolous suit
rather than pay much larger legal fees to prove non-infringement and/or
invalidity. No one can reasonably defend this type of abusive conduct and any
legislation that could effectively eradicate this bad behavior, without prejudicing
innocent patent owners, would be a tremendous benefit.
A. Solution: Revision of § 285
An appropriate mechanism to award attorneys’ fees in cases that are
frivolous exists in § 285 of the Patent Act. Currently, this provision reads:
§ 285. Attorney’s Fees
The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.97

This provision should require objective rather than subjective unreasonableness.
Therefore, I propose that 35 U.S.C. § 285 should be amended and a new section
should be inserted to read:
§ 285. Attorney Fees
The court in exceptional cases shall award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.

95
Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R.
845, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
96
Gryphon, supra note 6, at 568.
97
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006).
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A. EXCEPTIONAL CASE DEFINED. – For purposes of this section,
an ‘exceptional case’ is one in which an adverse party pleads a count of
patent infringement that is objectively unreasonable.

This change eliminates the cumbersome two-prong test courts use to determine
whether to shift attorneys’ fees and institutes a single objective standard that can
be applied consistently across the board. Additionally, it targets frivolous
litigation while avoiding the downfalls of the proposed SHIELD Act of 2013
discussed above.
1. Not Conditional with Respect to Identity of Patent Owner
Unlike the SHIELD Act, my solution focuses on the substance of the
infringement claim rather than the identity of the patent owner.98 Legislative
definitions of “bad actors” used in various other solutions come from an
outdated philosophy that seeks to cast aside infringement litigation brought by
patent owners who do not practice their inventions. Rather, all entities that assert
claims of patent infringement should be held to the same standard of conduct.99
Attempts to single out a class of patent owners will devalue patents, reduce the
ability of patent owners to realize a return on their investment, and ultimately
decrease the incentives to innovate.100
2. Objective Reasonableness Inquiry
The amendment of § 285 dispenses with the SHIELD Act’s proposed
“loser pays” rule, and uses an objective reasonableness standard. The essence of
the frivolous litigation problem that must be addressed is the lack of merit to the
infringement claim. The earliest point to determine whether a suit is
unreasonable is at the pleading stage, but a party with a small chance of success
is more reasonable in continuing at an earlier stage, while at a later stage would
not reasonably continue. As litigation moves forward to the summary judgment
stage, the Markman claim construction hearing, at the latest, marks the
opportunity to clearly assess the plaintiff’s likelihood of success in light of the
98

Most non-practicing entity definitions are unworkable because they are both
overbroad and under-inclusive. See infra Part I.
99
See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2 (manuscript at 119) (finding that focusing on
the parties rather than the merits of the patent claims will lead to a fundamentally flawed
and unfair result that will “significantly distort the supply of inventions”).
100
Paul D. Ackerman, The SHIELD Act – Is Creating “Second-Class Citizenship” for
Certain Patent Owners the Answer to the “Troll Problem”?, THE POINT OF NOVELTY
(Mar. 1, 2013), http://pointofnovelty.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-shield-act-is-creatingsecond-class.html (finding that legislation should target conduct rather than
discriminating against an entire class of patent owners, and that the SHIELD act may not
be tailored to solving the problem of nuisance litigation “without significantly impairing
the value of all patents”).
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court’s reading of the patent claims.101 It is this stage of patent litigation where
the court has performed claim construction and the patent owner will either have
a reasonable infringement claim or not as a matter of law.
An overhaul of the statute, such as proposed by the SHIELD Act is not
necessary, because § 285 is clear and simple. By re-defining an exceptional
case, my solution will keep the original terminology, but would dispense with
the subjective requirement for finding frivolousness.
B. Advantage of Revision over Existing Mechanisms and the SHIELD Act
The SHIELD Act directly burdens NPEs and is a significant step toward
the goal of reducing egregious legal disputes. The bigger picture is whether the
lawsuits are being brought because the defendants are infringers of a valid
patent,102 or whether the defendants are merely easy targets for a nuisance
lawsuit. That requires looking beyond the identity of the patentee.103 It means we
need to evaluate the infringement claims being asserted to determine whether
litigation is legitimate or nuisance, which turns on whether there are credible
patent claims that are valid, enforceable, and infringed.
Opponents of fee-shifting legislation must always raise the argument that
small inventors who do not abuse the court system may be wrongfully
discouraged from filing patent infringement claims as a result of this fee-shifting
measure because the increased risk of bearing the defendants’ litigation costs
would be too much to bear. Any fee-shifting provision should be limited to
language that will not have the effect of deterring valid claims of infringement.
The SHIELD Act of 2013 accomplishes this by awarding attorneys’ fees
whenever a defendant prevails on invalidity or noninfringement against an NPE
plaintiff. 104

101

Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996).
In this regard, the SHIELD Act of 2013 takes a step back from the 2012 version as
it proposes a strict fee-shifting provision without regard to reasonableness of the
infringement claim.
103
Bessen & Meurer, supra note 25 (manuscript at 22–23) (“The heterogeneous nature
of NPEs – ranging from universities, to semiconductor design firms, to trolls – suggests
that policy reform should address troll-like behavior rather than merely status as an
NPE.”).
104
Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R.
845, 113th Cong. § 285A(a)(4) (1st Sess. 2013).
[N]otwithstanding section 285, the Court shall award the recovery of full costs
to any prevailing party asserting invalidity or noninfringement, including
reasonable attorney’s fees, other than the United States, upon the entry of a
final judgment if the court determines that the adverse party did not meet at
least one of the conditions described in subsection (d), unless the court finds
that exceptional circumstances make an award unjust.
Id. (emphasis added).
102
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1. Conditions Defining Good and Bad Actors
Of the three protected categories of plaintiffs that the Shield Act exempts
from mandatory cost shifting, “(2) Exploitation of the patent,”105 will be a factspecific determination for courts to make. This definition intends to carve out an
exception for the traditional “practicing companies” but could provide a loophole for NPEs.106 The term “substantial investment” will require courts to
scrutinize patents obtained through research and development and those
acquired to be asserted (by both practicing entities and various types of NPEs).
“The item covered by the patent” will surely be an issue of claim construction.107
As this is a matter of law, surely a Markman hearing must occur before a
decision on the SHIELD Act motion is made.108
The “original inventor” category is clearly defined and should be easily
evaluated by courts. This category also includes original assignees of patents,
which is likewise easily verifiable.
105

Id. §§ 285A(d)(1)–(3).
(1) Original inventor. Such party is the inventor, a joint inventor, or in the case
of a patent filed by and awarded to an assignee of the original inventor or joint
inventor, the original assignee of the patent.
(2) Exploitation of the patent. Such party can provide documentation to the
court of substantial investment made by such party in the exploitation of the
patent through production or sale of an item covered by the patent.
(3) University or technology transfer organization. Such party is(A) an institution of higher education (as that term is defined in section
101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001)); or
(B) a technology transfer organization whose primary purpose is to
facilitate the commercialization of technology developed by one or more
institutions of higher education.

Id.
106
NPEs will argue that a substantial investment is made when they acquire a patent.
Will the substantial investment require simply that consideration be paid for the rights of
a patent? Surely not. However, to target NPEs the courts will have to craft a totality of
the circumstances rule that examines the specific technology covered by the patent and
the marketplace in which the company operates.
107
Congress’ usage of “item covered by the patent” is a misnomer because claims
delineate the rights of the patent holder. Presumably the legislature did not intend to
exclude method claims, which do not literally “cover an item.”
108
Under the “exploitation of the patent” exception, it seems that companies who buy
patents and assert them will have to argue that they practice the patent they are asserting.
If Google attempts to assert patents it acquired from Motorola, it is an NPE under the
SHIELD Act with respect to those patents which it does not engage in “production or sale
of an item covered.” This assumes that Google will not satisfy the “substantial
investment” inquiry. Google’s investment is no different than an NPE when it buys a
patent and later asserts it. The distinguishing characteristic, presumably, is litigation
conduct and the merits of the infringement claim.
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The “University or technology transfer organization” category presents a
straightforward definition of a University taken from the Higher Education Act
of 1965. However, defining a technology transfer organization as one “whose
primary purpose is to facilitate the commercialization of technology developed
by one or more institutions of higher education” may provide an avenue for
NPEs to find a safe haven.109 Could NPE shell companies do business as tech
transfer organizations for Universities? Will Universities become vessels for
NPE patent monetization? These scenarios seem unlikely because the definitions
of Universities and tech transfer offices will likely be construed narrowly by a
court.
The SHIELD Act is presented as legislation that will favor large and
small businesses, as both are targets of NPE plaintiffs. NPE litigation is usually
undesirable for small business defendants110 because the NPE has substantial
leverage over the company in several ways. First, responding to discovery can
be very burdensome and disruptive for the company, but not for the NPE, which
generally has few documents to produce and perhaps no witnesses.111 Further,
the stakes for the company can be substantial, while the NPE has nothing to lose
but its patent.112 Moreover, the practicing company faces potentially large legal
bills for defending the patent lawsuit and challenging the validity of even
overbroad patents, while the NPE likely has small or no legal bills, because it
likely has a contingency fee agreement with its lawyers.
But, what about small business/patent-owner plaintiffs? The patent
system is one of the few tools that small businesses have to compete against
larger, more established players in the market. Patent owners with valid and
infringed patents must be considered within this category as well as they often
turn to NPE’s to monetize their assets. The SHIELD Act would clearly devalue
patents, because the subsequent patent owners’ ability to bring suit will be
encumbered by fee-shifting and bonding provisions.
Does this mean a small company’s patent is less marketable? It seems that
the SHIELD Act would create a second-class status for patents, thereby
prohibiting inventors from realizing the full value of their patents should they
choose to sell them.113
2. Automatic Loser Pays
A fee-shifting scheme that simply forces the loser to pay by default
bypasses the need for establishing a “reasonableness” standard either upfront in
109
Michael Risch, Scratching my Head Over the SHIELD Act, MADISONIAN (May 10,
2013), http://madisonian.net/2013/03/10/scratching-my-head/.
110
Bessen & Meurer, supra note 25 (manuscript at 24).
111
Id. (manuscript at 29).
112
Id. at 14 (finding the mean legal costs for defense range from $420,000 for small
and medium companies to $1.52 million for large companies).
113
Ackerman, supra note 100.
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legislation or later through judicial precedent. To this end, the 2013 version of
the SHIELD Act, unlike the 2012 version,114 does not require a judicial
determination that the complainant did not have a “reasonable likelihood of
succeeding” in its claim for patent infringement. Instead, the 2013 version of the
SHIELD Act simply forces the losing plaintiff to pay by default, unless the
losing party falls into one of the groups listed in §§ 285A(d)(1)–(3).115
An alternative standard would not award fees simply because the patent
owner does not prevail, but would require more by setting a traditional standard
such as “reasonable likelihood of succe[ss]” versus “loser pays by default.” In
order to be successful, legislation implementing fee-shifting must include a clear
definition of the standard that must be met to trigger the award of attorneys’
fees. One of the greatest weaknesses of the SHIELD Act of 2012 was lack of
clarity in its use of the term “reasonable likelihood of succeeding” in
establishing the standard for awarding attorneys’ fees. 116 A more rigorous
definition or explanation of the term “reasonable likelihood of succeeding”
would have been helpful in giving courts less opportunity to circuitously debate
the Act, giving all parties—plaintiffs, defendants, third parties, and courts—a
better understanding of the impact of the legislation, and would, therefore, lead
to more efficient and seamless implementation of the fee-shifting provision.117
If a reasonableness standard is desirable, two criteria for establishing such
a standard are important. First, the new legislation should clearly delineate the
distinction between objective versus subjective reasonableness standards and
should precisely clarify which type of reasonableness standard should be applied
to the new fee-shifting scheme.118 Because remedies already exist to address
subjective unreasonableness under Rule 11, the next generation of this

114
See Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2012,
H.R. 6245, 112th Cong. § 285A(a) (2d Sess. 2012).
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 285, in an action disputing the
validity or alleging the infringement of a computer hardware or software patent,
upon making a determination that the party alleging the infringement of the
patent did not have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding, the court may award
the recovery of full costs to the prevailing party, including reasonable
attorney’s fees, other than the United States.
Id. (emphasis added).
115
Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R.
845, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
116
See Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2012,
H.R. 6245, 112th Cong. § 285A(a) (2d Sess. 2012); Chen, supra note 78, at 378.
117
Perhaps this will follow the USPTO standard for accepting petitions for inter partes
review: if a third party petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at
least one claim challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2006); Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 299–312 (2011).
118
Chen, supra note 78, at 378.
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legislation should elect to use an objective reasonableness test to evaluate the
plaintiff’s likelihood of success.
Second, the legislation should define when the likelihood of success
should be evaluated. Several points in the litigation timeline might serve as
convenient points for evaluation: just prior to filing the infringement claim, at
the summary judgment stage, or after the Markman claim construction hearing.
At each of these distinct points, a reasonable plaintiff who is evaluating the
likelihood of success of this litigation may be expected to either abandon or
continue the litigation depending on the plaintiff’s perception of the likelihood
of success. While a plaintiff with a lower likelihood of success at an earlier stage
in litigation may reasonably continue to pursue litigation, a plaintiff with a lower
likelihood of success at a later stage in litigation may be seen as less reasonable
in continuing litigation. An earlier understanding or evaluation of the likelihood
of successful litigation reduces the incidence of pure nuisance claims.119

III. CRITICISMS OF THE SOLUTION
Potential criticisms of this solution will address administrative efficacy of
the statute, economic efficiency, and public policy.
Some will question the effectiveness of a solution that does not single out
NPE’s directly and complain that it operates more broadly than necessary. Yes,
this statute does operate more broadly than a carve-out such as the SHIELD Act,
but it does so because the litigation conduct is the problem, not the identity of
the plaintiff. This solution holds all patent holders to the same standard, thereby
preventing bad actors from finding potential loopholes in the defined safe-haven
groups of the SHIELD Act.
A second potential criticism is that the solution may not be effective
against patent trolls with broad patents. This legislation gives defendants the
financial incentive to stand up to a plaintiff when they otherwise would not have
the resources to do so. This solution is targeted at defending frivolous claims of
litigation and striking down invalid patents. A case in which the claims actually
read on a defendant’s device will not be remedied by § 285. Issues of
interpretation of functional claims and objections to broad patents with a wider
claim scope than may still be concerns, but are outside the scope of this Article.
This is not a quick fix to the problem of NPE’s asserting patents. It is true
that costs will be incurred prior to and after the Markman hearing, but the
opportunity of a fee-shifting remedy is a significant deterrent to frivolous patent

119

See id. at 379.

278

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

[Vol. 13

suits and presents ammunition for defendants to use when negotiating a license
or deciding trial strategy. 120

CONCLUSION
Society is best served when the patent system incentivizes innovation, but
does not overcompensate by imposing unjustified costs onto consumers. Under
the current law, poor quality patents and frivolous infringement claims impose
such unjustified costs on society that ultimately lead to inefficiency. The award
of attorneys’ fees is an important remedy, which can change the behavior of bad
actors by allowing victims of frivolous litigation to defend themselves and
possibly invalidate low quality patents. Altering the requirements for awarding
attorney’s fees (by changing the definition of “exceptional case” under 35
U.S.C. § 285 to one in which an adverse party pleads a count of patent
infringement that is objectively unreasonable) will hold patent infringement
plaintiffs to a higher standard of conduct. This solution dis-incentivizes nuisance
claims by increasing the financial risk on the part of the plaintiff and decreases
the cost of litigation to innocent defendants.

120
Ross, supra note 76, at 4 (outlining a trial strategy of building a record of
communication that forces a plaintiff to take fee-shifting seriously and that can provide
negotiating leverage or serve as foundation for a successful motion under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285).

